IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS

COUNTY OF HORRY

FIFTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

KEVIN RALPH RICHARD,
Plaintiff,

C/A No. 2018-CP-2606158
ORDER GRANTING FACEBOOK, INC.’S
MOTION TO DISMISS

v.
FACEBOOK, INC., a Delaware corporation,
and MALEKO KIRK MALEPEAI,
individually,
Defendants.

Plaintiff Kevin Ralph Richard is the owner of Filet’s restaurant in North Myrtle Beach,
South Carolina. Compl., ¶ 13. He alleges that in December 2016 a former employee, Defendant
Maleko Kirk Malepeai (“Malepeai”), posted to Malepeai’s Facebook account various false and
defamatory statements about Plaintiff and his family. Id. at ¶¶ 14-16. To remedy the injuries
allegedly caused by Malepeai’s statements, Plaintiff now brings suit against Malepeai and
Defendant Facebook, Inc. (“Facebook”) for defamation, civil conspiracy, outrage, and
intentional infliction of emotional distress.1
The complaint does not describe the content of the allegedly defamatory statements. Nor
does Plaintiff allege that Facebook had any role in creating or developing the content at issue.
Rather, the crux of Plaintiff’s complaint is that Facebook’s platform “provid[es] inadequate
options to rectify the gross injustices faced by the Plaintiff,” and that Facebook should have
applied its Community Standards to remove the offending posts or suspend Defendant

1

Plaintiff has pleaded separate claims for outrage and intentional infliction of emotional
distress, but South Carolina courts have recognized that these are two names for the same cause
of action. See Hawkins v. Greene, 311 S.C. 88, 90, 427 S.E. 2d 692, 693 (Ct. App. 1993).
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SOUTH CAROLINA

Facebook moves to dismiss the claims as to Facebook under Rules 12(b)(2) and 12(b)(6),
SCRCP, on the grounds that (i) this Court lacks personal jurisdiction over Facebook, (ii)
Plaintiff’s claims against Facebook are barred by Section 230 of the Communications Decency
Act (“CDA”), 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1); and (iii) Plaintiff has failed to allege facts stating any
plausible claim for relief against Facebook. The motion to dismiss is GRANTED.
First, the complaint provides no factual allegations to establish that Facebook is subject to
general or specific personal jurisdiction in South Carolina with respect to the claims asserted in
this case. Because the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over Facebook, the claims against
Facebook must be dismissed. But even if personal jurisdiction were proper, the Court finds that
Section 230(c)(1) of the CDA immunizes Facebook from Plaintiff’s claims and that Plaintiff’s
allegations are insufficient to support any of the asserted claims against Facebook.
I.

The Court Lacks Personal Jurisdiction Over Facebook
The party seeking to invoke personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant bears the

burden of proving the existence of personal jurisdiction. Moosally v. W.W. Norton & Co., 358
S.C. 320, 327, 594 S.E. 2d 878, 882 (Ct. App. 2004). Here, the complaint does not allege any
facts supporting personal jurisdiction over Facebook. Plaintiff asserts essentially that Facebook
is subject to personal jurisdiction in this Court simply because it provides a platform that may be
used and accessed in South Carolina. But Plaintiff provides no support for that sweeping
proposition, and the Court is aware of none. Because the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over
Facebook, the claims against Facebook must be dismissed.
South Carolina courts exercise personal jurisdiction to the full extent authorized by the
United States Constitution. See Cockrell v. Hillerich & Bradsby Co., 363 S.C. 485, 491, 611

2
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Malepeai’s account. Compl., ¶¶ 20-21.

defendant and the forum state such that maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Moosally, 358 S.C. at 330, 594 S.E. 2d at 883
(citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 (1985)). “Further, the due process
requirement mandates the defendant possess sufficient minimum contacts with the forum state
such that he could reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.” Power Prods. & Servs.
Co. v. Kozma, 379 S.C. 423, 431-32, 665 S.E. 2d 660, 665 (Ct. App. 2008) (citing Cockrell, 363
S.C. at 491-92, 611 S.E. 2d at 508).
There are two types of personal jurisdiction: (1) general jurisdiction; and (2) specific
jurisdiction. Coggeshall v. Reprod. Endocrine Assocs. of Charlotte, 376 S.C. 12, 17-19, 655 S.E.
2d 476, 478-80 (2007). Neither type of jurisdiction is proper here because Plaintiff has failed to
establish that Facebook has sufficient minimum contacts with South Carolina.
A.

The Court lacks general personal jurisdiction over Facebook

A court may assert general jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant only when the
defendant’s “affiliations with the State are so continuous and systematic as to render them
essentially at home in the forum State.” Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564
U.S. 915, 919 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). “The ‘paradigm’ forums in which a
corporate defendant is ‘at home,’ [the Supreme Court of the United States has] explained, are the
corporation’s place of incorporation and its principal place of business.” BNSF Ry. Co. v.
Tyrrell, 137 S. Ct. 1549, 1558 (2017) (quoting Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 137
(2014)).
Facebook is a Delaware corporation, with its principal place of business in Menlo Park,
California. Compl., ¶ 2. General jurisdiction outside these forums is permissible only “in an

3
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S.E. 2d 505, 508 (2005). “Due process requires that there exist minimum contacts between the

substantial and of such a nature as to render the corporation at home in that State.’” BNSF, 137
S. Ct. at 1558 (quoting Daimler AG, 571 U.S. at 139 n.19). In BNSF, the Supreme Court of the
United States held that a national railroad company was not subject to general jurisdiction in
Montana notwithstanding the fact it had “over 2,000 miles of railroad track and more than 2,000
employees” in the state because those contacts were small compared to the company’s activities
throughout the country. Id. at 1559; see Daimler AG, 571 U.S. at 139 n.20 (“A corporation that
operates in many places can scarcely be deemed at home in all of them.”). Likewise, there is no
basis to assert general jurisdiction over Facebook here because Plaintiff has alleged no facts that
could establish that this is an “exceptional case” such that Facebook can be said to be
“essentially at home” in South Carolina. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, 564 U.S. at 919.
B.

The Court lacks specific personal jurisdiction over Facebook

“Specific jurisdiction is the State’s right to exercise personal jurisdiction because the
cause of action arises specifically from a defendant’s contacts with the forum.” Coggeshall, 376
S.C. at 16, 655 S.E. 2d at 478. “Courts have construed South Carolina’s long-arm statute . . . to
extend to the outer limits of the due process clause.” Hidria, USA, Inc. v. Delo, 415 S.C. 533,
540, 783 S.E. 2d 843 (Ct. App. 2016). Determining whether the requirements of due process are
satisfied requires a two-prong analysis of (1) the “power” prong, under which minimum contacts
grant a court the “power” to adjudicate the action; and (2) the “fairness” prong, which requires
the exercise of jurisdiction to be “reasonable” or “fair.” S. Plastics Co. v. S. Commerce Bank,
310 S.C. 256, 259-60, 423 S.E. 2d 128, 130-31 (1992). The plaintiff bears the burden of
satisfying both prongs. Id. at 259. “If either prong fails, the exercise of personal jurisdiction
over the [nonresident] defendant fails to comport with the requirements of due process.” Id. at

4
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‘exceptional case,’” when “a corporate defendant’s operations in another forum ‘may be so

“Under the power prong, a minimum contacts analysis requires a court to find that the
defendant directed its activities to residents of South Carolina and that the cause of action arises
out of or relates to those activities.” Moosally, 358 S.C. at 331-32, 594 S.E. 2d at 884. “It is
essential in each case that there be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of
the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state, thus invoking the benefits and
protections of its laws.” Id. at 332. “Under the fairness prong, [courts] examine such factors as
the burden on the defendant, the extent of the plaintiff's interest, South Carolina’s interest,
efficiency of adjudication, and the several states’ interest in substantive social policies.” Id.
Plaintiff’s allegations do not touch upon or give rise to any of the requirements for
specific jurisdiction over Facebook under either prong. The only contacts with South Carolina
that can plausibly be inferred from the allegations in the complaint are that (1) Facebook
operated a website that was accessible in South Carolina; (2) Facebook allegedly caused injury in
South Carolina; and (3) Facebook participated in an alleged conspiracy that included a South
Carolina resident. The first two contacts, without more, are never sufficient to confer personal
jurisdiction, and the third alleged contact is insufficient because it is not pleaded with the
specificity required to establish that jurisdiction exists.
Notably, courts in other states have also concluded that they lack personal jurisdiction
over Facebook notwithstanding the fact that the website is available to and used by residents of
those states and allegedly caused harm in those states. See, e.g., Georgalis v. Facebook, Inc..,
324 F. Supp. 3d 955, 961 (N.D. Ohio 2018); Ralls v. Facebook, 221 F. Supp. 3d 1237, 1242-44
(W.D. Wash. 2016); Gullen v. Facebook.com, Inc., No. 15 C 7681, 2016 WL 245910, at *1-3
(N.D. Ill. Jan. 21, 2016). As this Court has no basis for exercising personal jurisdiction over

5
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260.

1.

Operating a website in the state is not sufficient to confer personal
jurisdiction

Facebook’s operation of a website that is accessible worldwide does not establish
minimum contacts with South Carolina. The ability of forum residents to access a defendant’s
website is insufficient to establish minimum contacts with a forum state. Hidria, 415 S.C. at
544-45, 783 S.E. 2d at 845 (affirming the dismissal of a defamation claim); see also Power
Prods. & Servs., 379 S.C. at 434, 665 S.E. 2d at 666 (“[Plaintiff] failed to make any allegations
or produce any evidence a South Carolina resident purchased any product from or because of
[defendant’s] website, or that the website was particularly directed at South Carolinians”);
Smarter Every Day, LLC v. Nunez, No. 2:15-cv-01358-RDP, 2017 WL 1247500, at *3 (N.D.
Ala. Apr. 5, 2017) (“Courts generally agree that the ability of forum residents to access a
defendant’s website, standing alone, does not suffice to establish minimum contacts with the
forum state.”).
The ability of South Carolina residents to interact with a non-resident’s website is also
insufficient, standing along, to confer personal jurisdiction. In Poole v. Transcon. Fund Admin.
Ltd., for instance, the court held that it lacked personal jurisdiction over a defendant whose
website was “at least semi-interactive” because the plaintiff did not show that the defendant
“acted with the manifest intent to engage in business or other interactions within the state of
South Carolina.” No. 6:12-2943-MGL, 2013 WL 12243970, at *4 (D.S.C. Aug. 7, 2013).
Indeed, a South Carolina resident reaching out to access Facebook’s website is precisely the type
of “unilateral activity” that has repeatedly been held not to confer personal jurisdiction over a
nonresident. Vinten v. Jeantot Marine Alls., S.A., 191 F. Supp. 2d 642, 648 (D.S.C. 2002)
(defendant’s interactive website did not confer personal jurisdiction where plaintiff failed to

6
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Facebook, it must reach the same result.

anything to encourage South Carolina residents to visit the website”).
Here, the complaint alleges that a South Carolina resident, Defendant Malepeai,
“published” via Facebook “false and defamatory statements concerning the Plaintiff.” Compl.,
¶ 15; see also id. at ¶¶ 16-17. The complaint does not allege that Facebook took part in any of
these activities. Rather, they are quintessentially “unilateral activit[ies] of another party or a third
person” that do not establish contact between Facebook and South Carolina sufficient to confer
personal jurisdiction. Vinten, 191 F. Supp. at 645 (quoting Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475).
Courts in other states that have considered this issue with respect to Facebook have held
that it would be inconsistent with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to
subject Facebook to personal jurisdiction “simply because a user avails himself of Facebook’s
services in a state other than the states in which Facebook is incorporated and has its principal
place of business.” Ralls, 221 F. Supp. 3d at 1244; see also Gullen, 2016 WL 245910, at *2 (“If
the defendant merely operates a website, even a ‘highly interactive’ website, that is accessible
from, but does not target, the forum state, then the defendant may not be haled into court in that
state without offending the Constitution.” (quoting be2 LLC v. Ivanov, 642 F.3d 555, 559 (7th
Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted)). This Court agrees.
2.

Causing alleged injury in the state is insufficient to confer personal
jurisdiction

Plaintiff’s allegation that he suffered an injury in South Carolina as a result of Facebook’s
conduct is also insufficient to establish personal jurisdiction over Facebook in South Carolina.
The Supreme Court of the United States has “made clear that mere injury to a forum resident is
not a sufficient connection to the forum” to establish minimum contacts. Walden v. Fiore, 571
U.S. 277, 290 (2014). More specifically, a plaintiff’s allegation that he was injured in South

7

ELECTRONICALLY FILED - 2019 May 22 8:44 AM - HORRY - COMMON PLEAS - CASE#2018CP2606158

show that the defendant “directed its website at South Carolina residents” or “ha[d] done

website operator. See Hidria, 415 S.C. at 549-50, 783 S.E. 2d at 848. Rather, Plaintiff must
demonstrate that Facebook has purposefully availed itself of the forum by “specifically
target[ing] South Carolina readers.” Id. at 550; see also Power Prods. & Servs., 379 S.C. at 434,
665 S.E. 2d at 666; Goldowsky v. Gareri, C.A. No. 4:17-cv-2073-RBH-TER, 2018 WL 942278,
at *5 (D.S.C. Jan. 29, 2018) (finding no personal jurisdiction over a defendant who allegedly
defamed a South Carolina resident on a website accessible to South Carolinians because the
plaintiff failed to show that the defendant intended to direct the statements to residents of South
Carolina), report and recommendation adopted, 2018 WL 936382 (D.S.C. Feb. 16, 2018).
Plaintiff has not done so.
3.

A conclusory allegation of a conspiracy with a resident of South
Carolina is insufficient to confer personal jurisdiction

Count II of the complaint vaguely suggests that Defendants Facebook and Malepeai
“act[ed] in concert with one another” to “publish[] materially false information about the
plaintiff.” Compl., ¶ 32. Such allegations are insufficient to establish personal jurisdiction
because they are not pleaded with particularity. To establish personal jurisdiction on a
conspiracy theory, the “plaintiff must plead with particularity the conspiracy as well as the overt
acts within the forum taken in furtherance of the conspiracy.” Unspam Techs., Inc. v. Chernuk,
716 F.3d 322, 329 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting Jungquist v. Sheikh Sultan Bin Khalifa Al Nahyan,
115 F.3d 1020, 1031 (D.C. Cir. 1997)).
Here, Plaintiff’s civil-conspiracy allegations against Facebook could not be more
conclusory. Plaintiff speculates that “Defendants act[ed] in concert with one another,” but he
pleads no facts to support that allegation. Compl., ¶ 32. Because this averment “amounts to no
more than a bare allegation or logical possibility,” it “does not suffice to allege a plausible claim

8
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Carolina by an out-of-state website operator does not establish personal jurisdiction over the

conspiracy theory of personal jurisdiction.” Unspam Techs., 716 F.3d at 330.
In sum, Plaintiff has failed to make averments sufficient to carry his burden of
establishing that Facebook is subject to personal jurisdiction in this Court. Because this Court
lacks personal jurisdiction over Facebook, the claims against Facebook must be dismissed.
II.

Plaintiff’s Claims Against Facebook Are Barred by CDA Section 230(c)(1)
Even if Facebook were subject to personal jurisdiction in this Court, the Court finds that

Plaintiff’s claims would fail because they are barred by CDA Section 230(c)(1), 47 U.S.C. §
230(c)(1). The complaint seeks to hold Facebook liable for regulating what content it permits on
its platform. See Compl., ¶¶ 27, 33-34, 38, 45. Section 230(c)(1) of the CDA directly prohibits
such a claim.
Section 230(c)(1) immunity, “like other forms of immunity, is generally accorded effect
at the first logical point in the litigation process,” because “immunity is an immunity from suit
rather than a mere defense to liability.” Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591
F.3d 250, 254 (4th Cir. 2009) (quoting Brown v. Gilmore, 278 F.3d 362, 366 n.2 (4th Cir. 2002))
(internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis in original). Courts routinely dismiss lawsuits
against interactive computer service providers given the protections afforded under the CDA.2
Section 230 of the CDA provides that “[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer
service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another

2

See, e.g., Nemet., 591 F.3d at 254 (affirming grant of motion to dismiss based on CDA Section
230(c)(1)); Kimzey v. Yelp! Inc., 836 F.3d 1263, 1270 (9th Cir. 2016) (same); Barnes v. Yahoo!,
Inc., 570 F.3d 1096 (9th Cir. 2009) (same); Klayman v. Zuckerberg, 753 F.3d 1354, 1357 (D.C.
Cir. 2014) (same); Green v. Am. Online (AOL), 318 F.3d 465, 471 (3d Cir. 2003) (same).

9
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of the existence of a conspiracy,” nor does it “satisfy the requirements for establishing a

Section 230 (c)(1) establishes “broad” immunity from suit, “bar[ring] state-law plaintiffs from
holding interactive computer service providers legally responsible for information created and
developed by third parties.” Nemet, 591 F.3d at 254 & n.4. “Parties complaining that they were
harmed by a Web site’s publication of user-generated content have recourse; they may sue the
third-party user who generated the content, but not the interactive computer service that enabled
them to publish the content online.” Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413, 419 (5th Cir. 2008).
Ricci v. Teamsters Union Local 456, 781 F.3d 25, 28 (2d Cir. 2015) (“In short, a plaintiff
defamed on the internet can sue the original speaker, but typically cannot sue the messenger.”)
(internal quotations and citations omitted).3
CDA immunity applies if three conditions are met. See Nemet, 591 F.3d at 254.4 First,
Facebook must be a “provider . . . of an interactive computer service.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).
Second, the offending communications must be “provided by another information content
provider.” Id. Third, Plaintiff’s claims must be premised on Facebook’s role as “publisher” of

3

The policy underlying this rule is evident. As the Fourth Circuit has explained,
“[i]nteractive computer services have millions of users,” and Congress has recognized that “the
specter of tort liability in an area of such prolific speech would have an obvious chilling effect.”
Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 331 (4th Cir. 1997). “Faced with potential liability for
each message republished by their services,” for instance, “interactive computer service
providers might choose to severely restrict the number and type of messages posted.” Id.
“Congress considered the weight of the speech interests implicated and chose to immunize
service providers to avoid any such restrictive effect.” Id.
4

See also, e.g., Jones v. Dirty World Entm’t Recordings LLC, 755 F.3d 398, 409 (6th Cir.
2014); Klayman, 753 F.3d at 1357; Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1100-01; Green, 318 F.3d at 470;
Internet Brands, Inc. v. Jape, 328 Ga. App. 272, 277-78 (2014); Hill v. StubHub, Inc., 219 N.C.
App. 227, 236 (2012).

10

ELECTRONICALLY FILED - 2019 May 22 8:44 AM - HORRY - COMMON PLEAS - CASE#2018CP2606158

information content provider.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1). As the Fourth Circuit has observed,

A.

Facebook is an interactive computer service provider

The CDA defines “interactive computer service” as “any information service, system, or
access software provider that provides or enables computer access by multiple users to a
computer server.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2). Plaintiff does not dispute that Facebook meets this
definition. See Opp. at 4-6. Accordingly, the Court finds that the first element for Section
230(c)(1) immunity is satisfied.6
B.

The offending content was authored by another information content
provider

The CDA defines “information content provider” as “any person or entity that is
responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or development” of the content at issue. 47
U.S.C. § 230(f)(3). Plaintiff does not dispute that Defendant Malepeai, not Facebook, provided
the content at issue in this case. See Opp. at 4-6; see also Compl. at ¶ 15 (“Defendant Malepeai
published via his Facebook account false and defamatory statements.”). Accordingly, the Court
finds that the second element for Section 230(c)(1) immunity is also satisfied. See, e.g., Zeran v.
Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 329-330 (4th Cir. 1997) (applying Section 230 immunity where
a service provider’s platform was used by one of its subscribers to post allegedly actionable

5

As there is no binding South Carolina authority regarding CDA immunity, the Court
considers case law from the Fourth Circuit, as well as persuasive authority from other federal
circuits and state courts of appeal. See Chase Home Fin., LLC v. Risher, 405 S.C. 202, 213, 746
S.E.2d 471, 477 (Ct. App. 2013); Bass v. Isochem, 365 S.C. 454, 478, 617 S.E.2d 369, 382 (Ct.
App. 2005).
6

Other courts have likewise concluded that Facebook is an “interactive computer service
provider.” See, e.g., Klayman v. Zuckerberg, 910 F. Supp. 2d 314, 318 (D.D.C. 2012).

11
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the third-party content. Id. All three conditions are met here.5

C.

Plaintiff’s claims seek to hold Facebook liable for “a publisher’s traditional
editorial functions”

The third requirement for section 230(c)(1) immunity is met if a plaintiff “seek[s] to hold
a service provider liable for its exercise of a publisher’s traditional editorial functions — such as
deciding whether to publish, withdraw, postpone or alter content.” Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330; see
also, e.g., Jane Doe No. 1 v. Backpage.com, LLC, 817 F.3d 12, 20 (1st Cir. 2016) (same); Jones
v. Dirty World Entm’t Recordings LLC, 755 F.3d 398, 407 (6th Cir. 2014) (same); Klayman v.
Zuckerberg, 753 F.3d 1354, 1359 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (same); Johnson v. Arden, 614 F.3d 785, 792
(8th Cir. 2010) (same). In determining whether the third requirement is met, “what matters is not
the name of the cause of action” but rather “whether the cause of action inherently requires the
court to treat the defendant as the ‘publisher or speaker’ of content provided by another.” Barnes
v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1101-02 (9th Cir. 2009). If “the duty that the plaintiff alleges the
defendant violated derives from the defendant’s status or conduct as a ‘publisher or speaker,’”
then “[S]ection 230(c)(1) precludes liability.” Id. at 1102.
Here, each of Plaintiff’s claims seeks to hold Facebook liable for, and is derived from,
Facebook’s “exercise of a publisher’s traditional editorial functions — such as deciding whether
to publish, withdraw, postpone or alter content.” Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330. Plaintiff’s claims are
predicated entirely on allegations that Facebook “published,” and failed to block or remove,
allegedly defamatory statements posted by Defendant Malepeai.

7

See also, e.g., Klayman, 753 F.3d at 1358 (affirming a dismissal where “the complaint
nowhere alleges or even suggests that Facebook provided, created, or developed any portion of
the content” at issue); Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1124-25 (9th Cir.
2003); Green, 318 F.3d at 471; Internet Brands, 328 Ga. App. at 277.

12
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information).7

Count I: Defamation/Libel per se. See Compl., ¶ 24 (“The defendants have
published and tolerated material in such a way to deny the plaintiff a reasonable
opportunity to conduct a lawful business . . . .” (emphasis added)); id. ¶ 25 (“The
defendants’ intentional publication of false information . . . . (emphasis added));
id. ¶ 27 (“Because the Defendants have acted jointly to publish false
information . . . . (emphasis added)).



Count II: Civil Conspiracy. Id. at ¶ 32 (“That Defendants acting in concert with
one another, have published materially false information . . .” (emphasis added));
id. at ¶ 33 (“That Defendants’ actions in publishing false information . . .
constitute a combination of the defendants” (emphasis added)).



Count III: Outrage. Id. at ¶ 38 (“That Facebook published and consented to the
unlawful acts of Defendant Malepeai . . . (emphasis added)).



Count IV: Intentional Infliction of Mental/Emotional Distress. Id. at ¶ 42 (“The
Defendants entered a course of conduct to publish materially false information
about the Plaintiff . . . .” (emphasis added)).

Editorial decisions of this kind “fall[] squarely within th[e] traditional definition of a
publisher and, therefore, [are] clearly protected by [Section] 230’s immunity.” Zeran, 129 F.3d
at 332; see also Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1102 (“[P]ublication involves reviewing, editing, and
deciding whether to publish or to withdraw from publication third-party content.” (emphasis
added)); Klayman, 753 F.3d at 1359.
In Zeran, for instance, the Fourth Circuit held that Section 230(c)(1) barred a defamation
claim alleging that AOL had unreasonably delayed in removing defamatory messages, refused to
post retractions of those messages, and failed to screen for similar postings thereafter. 129 F.3d
at 330-31; see also Nemet, 591 F.3d at 254-55 (Section 230(c)(1) barred defamation claim
against website operator who allegedly published defamatory content created by third parties);
Winter v. Bassett, No. 1:02 CV 00382, 2003 WL 27382038, at *7 (M.D.N.C. Aug. 22, 2003)
(“The Fourth Circuit has clearly held that § 230 creates a federal immunity to any cause of action
that would make ISPs liable for information originating with a third-party user of the service.”),
13
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In his opposition, Plaintiff appears to concede that CDA immunity applies to his
defamation and conspiracy claims.8 See Opp. at 4-6. But he contends that the CDA does not
apply to his outrage and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims because, for those
causes of actions, “Plaintiff does not need to establish Defendant Facebook as the publisher of
the vulgar and false statements of Defendant Malepeai.” Opp. at 5. Plaintiff provides no
authority supporting that proposition, but the thrust of his argument seems to be that CDA
immunity does not apply if the material published is particularly offensive, or if an interactive
computer service provider is asked to remove allegedly offensive content but does not. Id. at 46. The Court disagrees.
First, as numerous courts have held, the applicability of Section 230(c)(1) immunity does
not turn on whether, or to what degree, the content at issue is offensive. Instead, what matters is
“whether the cause of action inherently requires the court to treat the defendant as the ‘publisher
or speaker’ of content provided by another.” Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1101-02. If it does, immunity
applies. Id. at 1102. Thus, courts routinely apply CDA immunity to all manner of tort claims,
including claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress (i.e., outrage) predicated on the

8

Plaintiff’s only argument against the dismissal of his defamation and conspiracy claims
on CDA immunity grounds is that the CDA is purportedly unconstitutional. Opp. at 4-5.
However, Plaintiff has failed to cite any case, and this Court is aware of none, holding that any
part of the CDA is unconstitutional. Moreover, federal courts of appeal, including the Fourth
Circuit, have repeatedly upheld lower court decisions applying the CDA to dismiss claims
against interactive service providers. See, e.g., Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330-31; Nemet, 591 F.3d at
254-55 (concluding Section 230(c)(1) barred defamation claim against website operator who
allegedly published defamatory content created by third parties). Accordingly, the Court
declines to hold that the CDA is unconstitutional.

14
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aff’d, 157 F. App’x 653 (4th Cir. 2005).

Winter, 2003 WL 27382038, at *7.9 Indeed, courts have held that interactive computer service
providers may enjoy CDA immunity even when a third party is alleged to have committed an
illegal act by posting the content at issue. See, e.g., Jane Doe No. 1, 817 F.3d at 22 (“[C]laims
that a website facilitates illegal conduct through its posting rules necessarily treat the website as
a publisher or speaker of content provided by third parties and, thus, are precluded by section
230(c)(1).”).10
Second, it is immaterial whether an interactive computer service provider is alerted to
offending content or asked to remove it. Removing content, or declining to do so, falls squarely
within the category of “editorial and self-regulatory functions” subject to CDA immunity.
Nemet, 591 F.3d at 258; Zeran, 129 F.3d at 331. That is true regardless of whether the
interactive computer service provider was asked to remove the content at issue. See, e.g.,
Universal Commc’n Sys., Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413, 420 (1st Cir. 2007) (“It is, by now,
well established that notice of the unlawful nature of the information provided is not enough to
make it the service provider’s own speech.” (citing Zeran, 129 F.3d at 332-33)).
In Zeran, for example, the plaintiff was allegedly subjected to defamatory and harassing

9

See also, e.g., Bennett v. Google, LLC, 882 F.3d 1163, 1165-68 (D.C. Cir. 2018);
Caraccioli v. Facebook, Inc., 700 F. App’x 588 (9th Cir. 2017); Kabbaj v. Google Inc., 592 F.
App’x 74 (3d Cir. 2015); Jones, 755 F.3d at 407; Getachew v. Google, Inc., 491 F. App’x 923,
925-26 (10th Cir. 2012).
10

See also, e.g., Jones, 755 F.3d at 407; Doe v. Am. Online, Inc., 783 So. 2d 1010, 101318 (Fla. 2001) (holding that Section 230(c)(1) preempts Florida law as to causes of action based
in negligence against an Internet Service Provider (ISP) as a distributor of information allegedly
in violation of Florida criminal statutes prohibiting the distribution of obscene literature and
computer pornography).
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posting of allegedly defamatory content. See, e.g., Winter, 157 F. App’x at 654, affirming

America Online, the online service provider, was notified of the messages, but allegedly delayed
in removing them, refused to post retractions, and failed to screen for similar postings thereafter,
thus allowing the messages to reappear. Id. In concluding that Section 230(c)(1) barred the
plaintiff’s claims, the Fourth Circuit specifically rejected that argument that notice of offending
content precludes CDA immunity. Id. at 332-34. Indeed, as the court explained, such an
approach “would defeat the . . . primary purposes of the [CDA] and would certainly lessen the
scope plainly intended by Congress’ use of the term ‘publisher.’” Id. at 334 (internal quotation
marks omitted).
In sum, even if Plaintiff had established personal jurisdiction as to Facebook, the Court
concludes that each of Plaintiff’s claims against Facebook would be barred by CDA Section
230(c)(1).11
III.

The Complaint Fails to State any Cause of Action Against Facebook
Finally, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state any plausible claim for

relief against Facebook.
To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), SCRCP, a plaintiff must “state facts
sufficient to constitute a cause of action.” Rule 12(b)(6), SCRCP; Paradis v. Charleston Cty.
Sch. Dist., 424 S.C. 603, 613, 819 S.E.2d 147, 152 (Ct. App. 2018), reh’g denied (Oct. 18,

11

During oral argument, Plaintiff’s counsel suggested that it would be appropriate to
defer the issue of CDA immunity until after discovery. The Court disagrees. As the Fourth
Circuit has explained, CDA provides “an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to
liability.” Nemet., 591 F.3d at 254 (quoting Brown, 278 F.3d at 366 n.2). Courts “resolve the
question of § 230 immunity at the earliest possible stage of the case because that immunity
protects websites not only from ultimate liability, but also from having to fight costly and
protracted legal battles. Id. at 255 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
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messages wrongfully associating him with the Oklahoma City bombing. 129 F.3d at 330-31.

“determine if the ‘facts alleged and the inferences reasonably deducible from the pleadings
would entitle the plaintiff to relief on any theory of the case.’” Rydde v. Morris, 381 S.C. 643,
646 (2009) (quoting Williams v. Condon, 347 S.C. 227, 233, 553 S.E.2d 496, 500 (Ct. App.
2001)). Factual allegations must be “well-pled” to be taken as true. Fabian v. Lindsay, 410 S.C.
475, 481, 765 S.E.2d 132, 135 (2014). “[A] claim should fail” if “a plaintiff states nothing more
than legal conclusions.” Paradis, 424 S.C. at 613 (citing Talbot v. Padgett, 30 S.C. 167, 171
(1889)).
A.

The complaint fails to state a claim for defamation

Plaintiff alleges that Facebook “published and tolerated [defamatory] material.” Compl.
at ¶ 24. But nowhere does Plaintiff’s complaint describe the content of any allegedly defamatory
statements. This deficiency is fatal to Plaintiff’s defamation claim. See, e.g., Paradis, 424 S.C.
at 613, 819 S.E. 2d at 153; McNeil v. S.C. Dep’t of Corr., 404 S.C. 186, 195, 743 S.E. 2d 843,
848 (Ct. App. 2013) (affirming dismissal of a defamation claim where the complaint failed to
“set forth with any specificity what the alleged false statements were”); Erby v. Webster Univ.,
C.A. No. 3:13-518-JFA-SVH, 2013 WL 5495586, at *3 (D.S.C. Oct. 1, 2013) (applying South
Carolina law, and concluding that the complaint failed to state a valid claim for defamation
because it failed to describe the content of the statements).
In Paradis, for instance, the complaint alleged that the defendant’s “statements and
actions, including false accusations that Plaintiff could not effectively teach her students and
manage her classroom, injured Plaintiff in her trade business and profession.” Paradis, 424 S.C.
at 613-14, 819 S.E. 2d at 153. The court found those allegations insufficient to support a
defamation claim because, among other reasons, the plaintiff failed to describe what was said.
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2018). This Court will “construe the complaint in a light most favorable to the nonmovant,” and

same holds true here. Plaintiff’s complaint recites legal conclusions without providing any
factual basis. Accordingly, his defamation claim against Facebook must be dismissed.
B.

The complaint fails to state a claim for civil conspiracy

Plaintiff’s claim for civil conspiracy likewise fails, for three reasons.
First, Plaintiff’s core allegation that Facebook “published and tolerated materially false
information” posted by Defendant Malepeai, even if true, does not plausibly demonstrate any
agreement between Facebook and Malepeai, much less an agreement whose “primary
purpose . . . [was] to injure the plaintiff.” Lee v. Chesterfield Gen. Hosp., Inc., 289 S.C. 6, 13,
344 S.E. 2d 379, 383 (Ct. App. 1986); see also Pye v. Estate of Fox, 369 S.C. 555, 567, 633 S.E.
2d 505, 511 (2006); Walker v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., C.A. No. 3:17-1935-MBS-SVH, 2017
WL 4617031, at *2 (D.S.C. Oct. 16, 2017) (applying South Carolina law, and granting a motion
to dismiss in part because “a civil conspiracy claim cannot exist unless two or more persons are
acting in concert”).12
Second, the claim fails to “allege additional acts in furtherance of a conspiracy rather
than reallege other claims within the complaint.” Hackworth v. Greywood at Hammett, LLC,
385 S.C. 110, 115, 682 S.E. 2d 871, 874 (Ct. App. 2009) (citing Todd v. S.C. Farm Bureau Mut.
Ins. Co., 276 S.C. 284, 293, 278 S.E. 2d 607, 611 (1981)). To support “a civil conspiracy claim,
one must plead additional acts in furtherance of the conspiracy separate and independent from

12

In South Carolina, a civil conspiracy consists of three elements: “(1) a combination of
two or more persons, (2) for the purpose of injuring the plaintiff, and (3) causing plaintiff special
damage.” Hackworth v. Greywood at Hammett, LLC, 385 S.C. 110, 115, 682 S.E. 2d 871, 874
(Ct. App. 2009).
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Id. at 614 (“Rule 12(b)(6) requires the plaintiff to allege facts. [Plaintiff] failed to do so.”). The

875 (granting motion to dismiss where plaintiff’s civil conspiracy claim reiterated the allegations
contained in other causes of action); Kuznik v. Bees Ferry Assocs., 342 S.C. 579, 611, 538 S.E.
2d 15, 31 (Ct. App. 2000) (“Because [the third party plaintiff] . . . merely realleged the prior acts
complained of in his other causes of action as a conspiracy action but failed to plead additional
acts in furtherance of the conspiracy, he was not entitled to maintain his conspiracy cause of
action.”). Here, because Plaintiff’s civil conspiracy claim relies on the same factual predicate as
his other causes of action, the civil conspiracy claim necessarily fails.
Third, Plaintiff has failed to allege special damages that “go beyond the damages alleged
in other causes of action.” Hackworth, 385 S.C. at 116-17, 682 S.E. 2d at 875-76; see, e.g.,
Todd, 276 S.C. at 293, 278 S.E. 2d at 611 (sustaining a demurrer because the complaint “does no
more than incorporate the prior allegations and then allege the existence of a civil conspiracy and
pray for damages”); Paradis, 424 S.C. at 616, 819 S.E. 2d at 154 (affirming dismissal of a civil
conspiracy claim, and noting that the claimed “reputational damages” for the alleged civil
conspiracy “are precisely the damages one would expect from defamatory statements”); Hotel &
Motel Holdings, LLC v. BJC Enters., LLC, 414 S.C. 635, 650-51, 780 S.E. 2d 263, 272 (Ct. App.
2015) (affirming a dismissal because “Appellants . . . failed to plead with specificity any special
damages . . . for conspiracy”). Plaintiff alleges that he has suffered damages for civil conspiracy
in the form of “injury to reputation and standing in the community, embarrassment, humiliation,
diminishment of earnings, and loss of goodwill.” Compl., ¶ 35. But these are precisely the
damages requested in his defamation claim, see id. at ¶¶ 27, 29, and his outrage claim, see id. at
¶¶ 45, 48 — none of which the complaint provides any factual basis for in any event.
C.

The complaint fails to state a claim for outrage or intentional infliction of
emotional distress
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other wrongful acts alleged in the complaint.” Hackworth, 385 S.C. at 115-16, 682 S.E. 2d at

Plaintiff’s complaint offers no allegations to suggest that Facebook’s regulation of unspecified
content, allegedly created and posted by Defendant Malepeai, was “so extreme and outrageous as
to exceed all possible bounds of decency and must be regarded as atrocious, and utterly
intolerable in a civilized community.”13 Nor does the complaint include any allegations to
suggest that Facebook has “acted intentionally or recklessly to inflict severe emotional distress.”
Melton v. Medtronic, Inc., 389 S.C. 641, 651, 698 S.E. 2d 886, 891 (Ct. App. 2010).
IV
For the foregoing reasons, Facebook’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED. IT IS
THEREFORE ORDERED that the complaint is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE as to
Facebook.

AND IT IS SO ORDERED.
_________________________________________.
Benjamin H. Culbertson
Resident Circuit Judge
Fifteenth Judicial Circuit
___________________, 2019
______________________, South Carolina

13

“To establish intentional infliction of emotional distress or outrage, a plaintiff must establish:
(1) the defendant intentionally or recklessly inflicted severe emotional distress or was certain or
substantially certain that such distress would result from his conduct; (2) the conduct was so
extreme and outrageous as to exceed all possible bounds of decency and must be regarded as
atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community; (3) the actions of the defendant
caused the plaintiff's emotional distress; and (4) the emotional distress suffered by the plaintiff
was so severe that no reasonable man could be expected to endure it.” Melton v. Medtronic, Inc.,
389 S.C. 641, 651, 698 S.E. 2d 886, 891 (Ct. App. 2010).
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Plaintiff’s claims for outrage and intentional infliction of emotional distress fail because
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